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II. TRASFORMAZIONI

Streaming subjectivation:
Two questions and one thesis about netflix*
Andityas Soares De Moura Costa Matos

This paper aims to investigate – shortly – the subjectivation process that emerges from Netflix, here understood as a spectacular apparatus that articulates, in a very specific way, the category of "subject". For this purpose, it uses ideas of authors such as Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri and Gilles Deleuze. The paper initially delineates a brief theoretical introduction to problems regarding subjectivation and desubjectivation in the post-modernity, especially considering the role played by the new technologies and the new media. Then, it presents two questions about Netflix and its relationship with the guilt, the common and the spectacle. The paper concludes with one thesis: Netflix is a new expression of political theology, since it works dividing and unifying the reality, like the disjunctive synthesis thought by Deleuze. Finally, the text indicates some quick hypothesis that point to a new use – profanatory and careless – of Netflix.

NETFLIX   SUBJECTIVATION   GUILT

DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS   POLITICAL THEOLOGY

> Only the child and the animal are innocent (*unschuldig*); the man must have
> guilt (*muss Schuld haben*).
>
> G.W.F. Hegel
> *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*

Introduction

Netflix is nowadays the major streaming service on the planet with more than 100 million of subscribers. The company was originally established in 1997 as a DVD delivery service through mail, currently offering its streaming services worldwide (190 countries), except from China, North Korea, Crimea, and Syria. In 2016, its revenue was US\$8.83bi, profiting US\$380mi in the same year. However, more than these impressive numbers, the most important aspect regarding Netflix is its capacity to establish a new way for people to relate to the media, to the world and to themselves, thereby becoming a powerful apparatus of (de) subjectivation.

In this regard, the paper intends to investigate the modes of (de)subjectivation that this apparatus utilizes, also indicating alternatives to its destitution and profanation, in the sense that Giorgio Agamben applies to these terms:

> And if "to consecrate" (*sacrare*) was the term that indicated the removal of things from the sphere of human law, "to profane" meant, conversely, to return them to the free use of men. The great jurist Trebatius thus wrote, "In the strict sense, profane is the term for something that was once sacred or religious and is returned to the use and property of men". And "pure" was the place that was no longer allotted to the gods of the dead and was now "neither sacred, nor holy nor religious, freed from all names of this sort, means of profanation". The thing that is returned to the common use of men is pure, profane, free of sacred names. But use does not appear here as something natural: rather, one arrives at it only by means of profanation (Agamben 2007, 73-74).

For this purpose, we will discuss two questions related to the specific functioning of Netflix (section 2), which will point to a proposal, with a philosophical character, regarding what Netflix does actually represent in the contemporaneity (section 3). Nevertheless, before we proceed to the critical-philosophical study of Netflix, we need to delineate a brief theoretical introduction to the epochal context in which it is located (section 1), bearing in mind some problems regarding subjectivation and desubjectivation in the post-modernity, especially considering the role played by the new technologies and the new media that characterize this scenario.

I.   (De)subjectivation, technotopia and contemporaneity

The power and the extent of the current (de)subjectivation processes are revealed when we consider its maximization through contemporary technology and technique, which promise to offer to society instruments of immediate presentification (digital democracy or e-democracy) [1] or ways to popularize cultural goods using internet, as in the case of Netflix.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to carefully think about this frame. Without underestimating the libertarian potential of the communication and entertainment technologies, we should recognize that they are responsible for the

most complete way of desubjectivation that has been worldly known, and this in a context of an extreme political-foundational gap, contributing to a radical disembodiment of the political power that we now support. Although the social network, the streaming services and the technologies associated to them can be used to convoke a popular assembly or to release a critical content film, they, mostly and in a long term, are used instead as structures that guarantee the removal of the subjects from the social life.

This happens because these technological devices are not simple apparatus that can eventually be turned against the power; by the contrary, they figure as a specific type of postmodern apparatus whose primary function is to desubjectify the subjects, rendering vain the justification that many of them use, according to which there would be correct and incorrect ways of using technology. Only who has been captured can think that way and, as a necessary result of this process, they cannot perceive it. As Agamben argues:

> Here lies the vanity of the well-meaning discourse on technology, which asserts that the problem with apparatuses can be reduced to the question of their correct use. Those who make such claims seem to ignore a simple fact: If a certain process of subjectification (or, in this case, desubjectification) corresponds to every apparatus, then it is impossible for the subject of an apparatus to use it "in the right way". Those who continue to promote similar arguments are, for their part, the product of the media apparatus in which they are captured (Agamben 2009, 21).

When networks and streaming services filter all social relations, the experience of life in society is impoverished and formalized, shared and/or reproduced to the same extent of its lack of realism. The gadgets – cell phone, tablets, computers – that make possible the experience of Facebook or Netflix become thus the true gate to the law, never surmountable by its users, in the exact sense of Kafka's terrible parable (*Before the law*). The users actually limit and value their experience based on the continuous insertions in the parallel universes to which they submit themselves, whether they called Facebook, Netflix, or any other one. The problem is that these universes do not communicate with the world of political action. This world, which is always conflicting, contradictory, and present, is replaced by another world in which new identities – intensively mediated – overlap with those that gave rise to them, settling a process that affects not only the political level of bourgeois-liberal representativeness, but also almost all the social dimensions.

The communicational logic is guided by the intense mediatic exposure, which, in turn, legitimizes itself through an even faster process of complete insertion of the life on the internet, the only place for "action" recognized as legitimate and "real" by the users. The political action, aestheticized to the limit, becomes the exhaust valve for the guilt created by the omission, or even worse, turns itself into a privileged way of building mediatized identities that want to *appear* socially responsible and libertarian, but deep down, refuse to bodily participate as living beings in the causes that they support, weakening and exposing them to a process of emptying, typical of the tired post-modernity.

Without being able to revisit here all the profound criticism addressed to the problem of technique, especially the one peculiar to an important part of the German thought of the first half of the 20th century (Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin etc.), it is necessary

to recognize that the belief in the libertarian possibilities of apparatuses such as the e-democracy, Facebook and Netflix are nothing more than a technotopia that ignores the basic warning addressed to the views that intend to depoliticize the men's world based on the argument that technological innovation and the domain of digital machines/platforms would be neutral and, therefore, able to guarantee the collective wealth: any machine – as well as its effects and results, for example, Netflix – composes a concrete dimension of ideological superstructure. According to Charles Douglas Lummis, machines are human relationships materialized (Lummis 1996), which is the reason why they can never be neutral or apolitical; contrarily, they express certain socially determined and constituted desires and intentions in their own configuration. In the following sections (2 and 3) we will specifically discuss the desires and intentions related to Netflix, as well as its fractures and contradictions.

Each society produces the machines necessary to the maintenance of the original political decision that continually bases it. In a society in which the rational or dialectical mediation has become problematic – as presented by Carlo Galli in his significant book on Carl Schmitt (Galli 2010) – and which is based, thus, on the ideas of separate power, hierarchy and liberal representation, the belief in the magical powers of technology would be just another element for the strengthening of these limited notions of the political. The simple acceptance of the e-democracy's procedures, with the popularization of the network and the machines that keep it active, does not in any way determine important political transformations, as the very core of what it consists – or what it can be (*potentia*) – the politics is not questioned and stressed, topic briefly discussed in the last section of this paper.

According to the Invisible Committee, the technological paraphernalia that we enjoy today is only used to refuse, in a hallucinating way, our contact to the world, which maintains the crisis which is above all, before being ecological, political or economic, a crisis of presence. The separate power – the term is here used in the meaning applied by Guy Debord in the first and fundamental chapter of *The society of the spectacle* – is only able to impose itself in front of a void, in an artificial absence that separates the living beings and the things, changing mutant subjectivities into fixed subjects. Therefore, it is necessary to the separating and mediating power to deepen the absences while covering them. The smartphone is an essential instrument for this purpose, since, by apparently concentrating all the access to the world – it is in the same time a telephone, a compass, a cinema, a place of erotic and/or family gatherings –, ends to function as a prosthesis that prevents any relation with the presence of persons or things, imposing a state of constant semi-presence to its users (The Invisible Committee 2015), now completely subjectivated in the role of zombies that the technocratic postmodernity reserves to them.

Two senior Google executives published an influential work in which they predict the imminent replacement of representative governments by the online direct participation of all citizens, thereby shaping a new, efficient, creative, and participatory digital democracy (Cohen & Schmidt 2014, 3), in which both Google and Netflix can participate as forums of ideological basis. All of this will only be possible, as said by the neoprophets, through the increasingly conscious use of an instrument that human beings have created and still do not understand very well: the internet, classified by the authors as the most important anarchic experiment of human history.

However, this prediction is no more than a lie. The digital democracy dreamed up by the technophiles is impossible due to the same reasons that make it seem seductive. Instead of eliminating the government, the cybernetics enables new types of separate governments, presenting them, however, as transparent and open to the participation of all. Rather than creating new subjectivities, freer and more responsible, the apparatuses such as Netflix continually desubjectify and resubjectify whilst reactivating the ancestral mechanism of guilt, as it will be discussed in section 3.

The Invisible Committee is right in uncovering the decline of the old sovereignty centralized on the idea of individual subjectivities, process that gives way to an impersonal government in which the subject merely appears as part of a much larger structure, in which it is only important to forecast trends based on large amounts of statistical data – such as the big data –, essentials to the functioning of Netflix's mechanism. In this context, the classic idea of "one man, one vote", translated in the digital shape of the alleged e-democracy, reveals itself illusory and useless. In the cyber government, individuals and their rights to freedom, intimacy and election have no weight. It only matters that they continually feed the system with their data, improving the algorithms. This is the very essence of the apparatus like Netflix, which only works if people constantly use it, refining and expanding their functions and codes.

Behind the magic promise of a digital democratic society sustained by individual subjects accessing their computers or smartphones to see Netflix or Facebook, there is a clear project of global control and management that disregard them as living political beings, considering them merely points of network maintenance. If the old sovereignty produced subjects to establish a separation between who commands and who obeys, the new cybernetic science of government dissolves each and every subjectivity in the very lack of relation imposed on the subjects, who docilely share all of their data and experiences in an abstract community that no longer need to be governed, since it is by itself government in a pure state, self-vigilance and self-control beyond any panoptic: consummate separation, Guy Debord would say. It unites because it separates. It separates because it unites. Disjunctive synthesis. Like it occurs in Netflix, as it will be discussed in the following sections.

II.   Two questions about Netflix

In this second section, we do not intend to technically analyze Netflix's functioning, but rather to explore the subjectivation process that occur in it through the discussion of two very specific aspects in its logic, to enlighten its totalizing meaning (which will be discussed in the third section).

The first question that seems essential to us is: *Why some movies and TV shows constantly get in and get out of Netflix?*

What is at stake here is the old guilt mechanism, which keeps under disguise its irrevocable mutuality with capital. The movies and TV Shows offered by Netflix – whether produced by it or other media companies – are not owned by anyone who pays the 7,99€ to access it, becoming only objects of use, since it is possible for an user to simultaneously watch the same movie with many others users, without the use of one limit the use of the other. This feature could deceive us by indicating the possibility of a common use. However, through a more carefully analysis, it demonstrates that it is the exact opposite. The movie

– take *Star Wars V: The Empire Strikes Back* as an example – does not become common just for being available in the Netflix catalog. On the contrary, its private features are even more strengthened, since it continues to have an owner. Specifically in the case of productions that were not created by Netflix, which are the overwhelmingly majority of its catalog, the viewer has only a limited right of use, that lasts for a certain time and then it is vanished.

This evinces the functioning of which Giorgio Agamben called unprofanable. In his words:

> If, as has been suggested, we use the term "spectacle" for the extreme phase of capitalism in which we are now living, in which everything is exhibited in its separation from itself, then spectacle and consumption are the two sides of a single impossibility of using. What cannot be used is, as such, given over to consumption or to spectacular exhibition. This means that it has become impossible to profane (or at least that it requires special procedures). If to profane means to return to common use that which has been removed to the sphere of the sacred, the capitalist religion in its extreme phase aims at creating something absolutely unprofanable (Agamben 2007, 82).

Agamben and several others philosophers see in the use a mechanism capable of deactivating the right of property. However, the spectacle proves that even the use could be reversed and transformed into an apparatus of contemplative subjectivation, turning it against those who might become free from the capital. In this regard, the majority of movies and TV Shows shown on Netflix, since they belong to someone – in the example, to Disney – and, therefore, are not common, only offer an apparent and rigidly controlled use, which cannot be shared or profaned. We potentially challenge – what is a paradox – the property right when we have a DVD or even the file of a movie, which can be borrowed, uploaded, launched in the web, copied and so on. However, that becomes impossible when the radical loneliness of Netflix allows us only a private and limited use (controlled by login and password) of cultural goods marked unequivocally by the sign of property, more and more accumulating, more and more perfect in its perception that the use constitutes a dimension to be neutralized, so as to make it harmless, leading it to the juridical matrix of property in whose it appears just like another of its powers. In fact, say the lawyers, the owner can use, enjoy and dispose of his own property, thereby denying, by this acts, an ontological dignity to the use, one that could be potent enough to antagonize the owner apparatus.

As I said before, another element that explains the change of many TV Shows and movies on Netflix is the guilt. By knowing that these goods will not be available forever – being, therefore, scarce in a radically new sense, which nevertheless ceases to be a harbinger, in the manner proposed by the old political economy denounced by Marx –, the viewer feels obliged to use them as quickly as possible, in order to not lose the precious opportunity that is offered to him for a mere 7,99€ monthly. Furthermore, if we search for something on Netflix and we cannot find it, Netflix even informs us that what we are looking for was available at an uncertain moment, thus, throwing for us the burden of our absence in the right time and the right place, that is, in the limit, the wholeness of the life experience to be converted in time for spectacular devotion. The time for devotion is the access time. This not only refines the algorithm but also intends to keep a perpetual and desperate connection – we will never be able to watch everything we want –, an afflictive and productive relation – there is always more and more

and, if you have not watched what is no longer available, it is your fault. It reappears here, therefore, with all its terrible morbidity, the Benjaminian figure of the capitalism as a religion without holydays or pauses, pointing to an experience of total subjectivation in which guilt is the product of a constant cult that never redeems (Benjamin 1991). Instead: it produces more guilt.

The frequent change of movies and TV Shows on Netflix encapsulates the viewer, like the old Cartesian subject, which reemerges now as someone that watches, *ergo* exists; and produces an alienated subjectivity that, paradoxically, uses the competition with itself, betting how many hours per day someone can be plugged in this *experimentum vitae* completely unrelated to any notion of community, which appears only as an epiphenomenon of the algorithm, to indicate those goods that are on "top" or are the "most popular" ones. If the sharing that social networks as Facebook require as a rule does not guarantee by itself any potentiality for the construction of the common, what about an apparatus like Netflix? It was designed and thought to ensure an individual and private experience, tailored to particular tastes of its users – "the strangest the better", "European movies awarded in Cannes", "Movies and TV Shows to young adults", and so on –, all of them treated like pinpoints essences. However, if Netflix structures itself in order to offer an experimentation/production of the own privacy, then why does it not explore the more tempting and lucrative side of the spectacular privacy?

In other words, and that is the second question: *Why is there not a section to porn movies on Netflix?*

The question, clearly, has nothing to do with the others streaming porn services in the world, including the Brazilian Sexflix – threatening by Netflix to be prosecuted for irregular use of its name and image **1** –, but to know why Netflix itself, the most powerful and influential visual media streaming service, does not have a section to porn movies (or even several sections, based on the preferences of the users), and still makes joke about this possibility. In fact, in April, 1st, 2017, the proverbial liar's day, Netflix launched two videos in which it promised to add "adult content" to its catalog. **2** In the first of them, we see a young housewife, barely naked, with a temper at same time imperious and languishing, opening the door to an electrician with a body equally Euclidian,

1 http://www.diariodepernam-buco.com.br/app/noticia/viver/2017/05/04/internas_viver,702263/brasileirinhas-lanca-sexflix-com-filmes-pornos-e-e-notificada-pela-n.shtml

2 http://cinepop.com.br/netflix-anuncia-adicao-de-filmes-porno-em-seu-catalogo-141159

suggesting to us that between them will begin soon the craziness of a spectacular copula. However, the "adult content" is solved in a joke, i.e., in a "class" about how to change the resistance of the electric shower, something obviously reserved for adults. The joke, nevertheless, is deeper than the end of the video in which the electrician, after replacing the resistance of the shower and actually taking a shower, says that he never takes more than five minutes. The video is developed with a strict obedience of all the canons and formal requirements of porn movies, as if Netflix wanted to tell us that it does not have a porn section because it simply does not want to, since it knows the arcanes not only of its reproduction, but, mainly, of its production.

In this fact lays more than an obvious moralism, which does not make sense in our time, since, within four walls, the specific and "natural" *locus* of Netflix, in the despotic room of the *oikos*, even the fascists confess to be multicultural,

tolerant and sexually liberated, as is the case of Alice Weidel, that is only contradictory to a mind too embedded in the logic of the *siècle* XIX. Weidel, who is the leader of an extreme right party, *Alternative for Germany* (*Alternative für Deutschland*), that conquered, in the last parliamentary elections in September, 13% of the votes and 98 chairs in the *Bundestag*, is assumed lesbian and married to a Sri Lanka immigrant, despite the defense by her party of the traditional family (man-woman) and of the closing of the German borders for immigrants. Alice Weidel explains those paradoxes stating that, within the private space of her home – which, incidentally, is in Switzerland –, she can make choices that would be unacceptable in the public space. **3**

A small and surprisingly essay titled *Idea del comunismo* by Giorgio Agamben can help us to understand the goals of Netflix when it refuses to host porn movies. Although Agamben's text is from the 80s and pornography has changed a lot since then, what we intend to discuss, in this paper, is not

an archeology or sociology of pornography, but rather to bring it as an exemplary case able to illustrate the ambiguous relation between public and private in the context of (de)subjectivation mechanisms such as Netflix. In this regard, as Agamben affirms, the eternal political reason of pornography is to reveal the potential of happiness in the most insignificant situations of the everyday life and in every way of human sociability (Agamben 1985). Once again, the Italian author assumes an unique Benjaminian statement, according to which it is in the most ridiculed and despised ideas of a time that the utopian path to revolution can be found. In the first line of Agamben's text, he says that the utopia of a classless society reveals itself in pornography. This is due, firstly, to the caricatured excess that marks the differences between the classes in porn movies, even in their clothes – the housewife and the electrician –, and then to the sexual relations that transfigure these differences, pointing to a world in which happiness is always available, always at hand.

It seems, therefore, that pornography deals with some potency to happiness, to the meeting and to the common that in no way is close to the apparatus of Netflix. Considering this idea, one could oppose that pornography is usually enjoyed alone, at home and as anonymously as possible, which reveals itself as a perfect profile to Netflix's user. However, this thought is wrong, since in the spectacular world what matters is *what is seen*, not *who sees*; the self is reduced to a mere function of the image. And, in this regard, the pornographic images do not stop to promise us, repeatedly, an easy happiness, an effortless, endless and worthless happiness translated in the excess and the fading materiality of perfect bodies always available. More than the loneliness of the viewer, the pornography itself – whether we like it or not, presents itself in silly, cruel or even exciting way – involves the idea of an endless community of desiring bodies that cannot be simply exposed on Netflix under the heading of a new profile framer, next to "kids" profile, without putting at risk all the mechanism that requires the reaffirmation of the home – and, for extension, of the family – as an opposite space to the public square, as wanted and practiced by Alice Weidel. Netflix is even more "post-modern" than Alice: it does not reaffirm the division between private and public, *oikos* and *agora*, reserving to each one distinct biopolitical competences, but, instead, it turns the *agora* in a function of *oikos*, dissolving the public in a residue that so becomes incommunicable with the mere

private, building a species of immunized community, a community of the ones that do not have communication, **4** where the possibility of happiness never will be solved by contact or infection, but by a seeming flow that, driven by algorithms, does not consider the individual; and this is not to overcome it in the name of the common – something that exists in the potential of every really pornographic gesture, which can only be done when it de-substantiates the real of the everyday *sub-iectum* –, but to return to old figures of subjectivation that can only be theological-political. In this regard, here is my thesis:

4 The recent tendency of "spontaneous sharing" of Netflix – when someone watches it through the cell phone or tablet of someone else in public places as buses, squares, lines, etc. without permission, "sneezing" and spying – just confirms my argument, since, in situations like that, 38% of the people say that pretend that nothing is happening and keep watching, but 23% pause the show and 21% cover the screen. See: https://www.tecmundo.com.br/cultura-geek/124132-nova-moda-usuarios-assistindo-netflix-publico-frequencia.htm

III.   Netflix is political theology

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, probably having in mind the paragraph 54 of *La Societé du Spectacle* by Guy Debord (Debord 1992), developed the concept of *disjunctive synthesis*, which indicates an apparatus that unites and divides at the same time, enabling a circular functioning in which both axes turn around themselves, dividing to unite and uniting to divide (Deleuze & Guattari 1972). The classic example is political representation that allows the unitary idea of "people", denying, at the same time, the real people, and separating it from itself due to their representatives, as demonstrated by Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri (Hardt & Negri 2004, 241-242). However, the most recent and strongest example of disjunctive synthesis is given by Roberto Esposito, another qualified reader of Deleuze. For him, the theological-political machine can be understood as an apparatus which, like the "person" category – the most mature and unsuspected fruit of the theological-political machine –, divides the reality in transcendence and immanence, making of one the secret basis of the other in a circular dialectics that, as a game of *chiaroscuro*, does not only closes the access to the basis, but also keeps the living beings constantly in tension in inclusive-exclusive operations (Esposito 2013).

This apparatus described by Esposito is intrinsically connected with the logic of exception demonstrated by Agamben through his series *Homo Sacer*. In this work, the exception, firstly understood as a certain apparatus which organizes itself based on the poles *zoé/bios*, grows and indicates a general function – an accumulation of apparatus – that comprehend not only a particular case of biopolitics, but also a totalizing structure called bipolar anthropological machine. This structure divides and creates an hierarchy into reality, bringing as the secret basis of a practice or of an idea its opposite, as in the dyads *anomia/nómos*, kingdom/glory, potency/act, animal/human, constituent power/constituted power, revolution/reformation, indicating, thus, an horizon of inability to overcome the machine, which intends to work by itself, autotelically, already without any significant contact with the living beings that continually are subjectivated and desubjectivated under the sharp – but flexible – horizon of the capital (Agamben 2014).

In this context, since these three main participants (Agamben, Negri and Esposito) do not dialogue among themselves, assuming the inescapable heritance of Deleuze in a very different way, the specific contribution of Esposito to this debate is to think the most terrible of the dyads, that is, transcendence and

immanence, poles that spinning over themselves in the emptiness, originate the theological-political machine of the West. For this purpose, Esposito resumes a potent reflection of the very last Deleuze, which, in postulating the immanence field, concludes that it cannot be understood as a space opposed to transcendence. The ones that understood it in that way confused immanence with empiricism, failing to notice that the immanence performs the character perpetually unfinished of the real, its feature to contain itself and not to create an outside, in order to integrates itself by transcendence and immanence, at the same time (Deleuze 2003).

In this sense, Hardt & Negri affirm that post-modernity – and the Empire that makes itself owner of it – is defined by the impossibility to be thought in terms of inside and outside (Hardt & Negri 2000). The immanence is absolute and happens – as the multitude and the Empire – inside borderless structures, being our task to transform it or, as proposed by Agamben, to profane it. Against this multitudinous tendency, the theological-political machine intends to establish once again the borders, the inside and the outside, the unsurpassed difference between transcendence and immanence, even if it operates beneath an exceptional or synthetically-disjunctive logic, problematically requiring the assumption of the immanence field.

Finally, what we propose is that Netflix – and everything it represents – is a special figure of the theological-political machine, and that is why it is entangled in the very paradoxes of this apparatus, what, in an even more paradoxical way, empowers it. Recapitulating: the theological-political machine is paradoxical because, working under the logic of the inclusive-exclusion in order to assert an inside and an outside, an immanent domain and a transcendent domain, has necessarily to do it under the background of immanence, that does not recognize inside and outside, since it operates under an ontological unlimited horizon. This dual character of the theological-political machine is appropriated by an apparatus (Netflix) that, being itself also dual, it is able to assert and to impose its duality everywhere it passes, thus, granting a presence which is permanent and virtually absent.

From this perspective, rise the difficulties of analyzing Netflix: the subject that it constitutes in collaboration with others subjects, but which uses its goods in the safety of home or notebook, is it a public or a private one? The Netflix reproduces or produces subjectivities? Is it adapted to the post-moderns dynamics of the non-sovereign flux and to the non-identity *queer* monstrosity or it just reaffirms localities and *argots*? – as seems to indicate its "national" TV Shows (examples: the Brazilian *3%*, the Italian *Suburra* and the German *Dark*) and its "identity" TV Shows (*Sense 8*, *Orange is The New Black,* and so on), that are tailored not only for specific political communities, but also to groups that describe themselves as minorities. Does it free when it makes available only what can be used by the subject – no movies or TV Shows are property of the Netflix's user or can be downloaded or appropriated – or does it reaffirm, in a even more strong way, the logic of property? – now restrict to the producers and owners of the movies and TV Shows that get in and get out of the catalog, artificially imposing to immaterial goods, characteristics of the XXI century, the logic of property control, typical of the material goods from the classical economics based on scarcity. In this sense, regarding choice, can we consider that the availability of the *menu*, with pre-fixed options, even it is mutable, truly free the consumer, does it actually have a "right to choose"? – as in the elections of the

"democratic" nations, confirming, therefore, the logic of *menu*, present itself in all level of the capitalist biopolitical life (from videogames to supermarkets, from plastic surgery to haircuts), what Germán Huici demonstrated to be essential to the consolidation of the capitalism as a contemporary religion (Huici 2016).

The fact that these questions cannot be answered in a clear mode should not compromise the assertion that it is possible to make these questions. It is exactly in the impossibility to decide installed by them that rests the necessary escape lines not only to a minor politics that rises from confused practices – although never unorganized –, but also to observe effective and concrete resistances that make the disorder, the multiple and the entropy grow. Considering Netflix as an apparatus that points to transcendence – imposing on its users an impoverished experience of use that always takes the risk of turns itself in guilt or contemplation, indicating its own inexhaustibility in a expanding (its own movies and TV Shows) and mutant (movies and TV Shows from others) catalog that condemns us to the continuous privatization of the sight and of the choice –, it is urgent to introduce a *careless use* that knows not only to deactivate and let behind this intricate mesh, but also to give it new significations.

In this regard, strategies that would come to profane this new political theology could be represented as simple gestures, such as the public, open and random exhibition of TV Shows and movies from Netflix, in a systematic and interested political way, in schools, theaters, movie theaters, streets, squares, buildings, etc., passing through the offer of devices to open the access, what, in the limit, in the spirit of Tiziana Terranova ideas of free labour of collective minds in the Net (Terranova 2004, 73-97), could congregate endeavors to the creation of a *Contraflix* in the web, with the availability of the entire content of Netflix to the public, with no need to pay and with the additional possibility to create biddings between the users, that would be responsible for the continuous protection and the necessary nomadic reallocation of the platform, which, for obvious reasons, would be target to uninterrupted legal, political and economical attempts of neutralization. This *Contraflix* would be fed by the users, and would not be limited to being only a copy of the Netflix. The users must redirect the expectations of the passive contemplation to a ground of common construction that, although similar to YouTube, would be in of a much higher quality, having no requirements of personal profiles, thus congregating with much more intensity TV Shows and movies that became cult objects associated to Netflix and its characteristic "discommunicant" and private experience.

Lastly, in the midst of the strategies of careless use, we must indicate the functions of papers such as the present one, that bring Netflix to the pages of a philosophy journal. It inarticulate the dyads responsible for ripping apart high culture and entertainment, criticism and enjoyment, reading and watching television, indicating an urgent disorder of places, which becomes more radical due to the ontological and immanent mark that characterizes, in a very subtle and powerful way, desiring machines such as Netflix and ourselves

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